Bulgaria says it has shut down the longest-running cyber-espionage operation known to have targeted its state administration. Innovation and Digital Transformation Minister Ivan Vasilev announced it at a Council of Ministers briefing on 18 November 2026. According to the minister, several international hacker groups had hidden access to government networks from 2021. They downloaded at least 130 gigabytes of state documents, which he put at more than 62 million pages. Reports from the national news agency BTA, Novinite and Moldova's IPN all give the same figures. Vasilev said investigators have so far found no evidence that Bulgarian citizens' personal data was compromised. He has also sent the case to prosecutors to examine what state authorities did and failed to do over the past five years.
What Happened
According to the minister, several hacker groups were inside Bulgarian state systems starting in 2021, and investigators found more cases of unauthorized access dating from 2022. BTA quotes Vasilev calling it "the longest-running known case of cyberespionage against Bulgarian institutions."
Reports give a slightly different order of events, so the dates should be read with care:
- First alert, 23 June 2026. Novinite reports that Bulgaria's new national cybersecurity monitoring system flagged unusual activity on one state institution's network that day. The Cybersecurity Center at the state IT company Information Services AD raised the alert, and the national Computer Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT) was brought in. IPN gives the same June timing.
- August 2026. Novinite and IPN describe August as the month the unauthorized access was "discovered". BTA's Bulgarian-language report quotes Vasilev saying the government told the public in August that unauthorized access had been found and that a large technical investigation was under way. The best reading is that the June alert was confirmed as a long-running intrusion and made public in August.
- August to November. The ministry's press office, as reported by Novinite.bg, says a special cross-government working group has been running a containment plan since August. The plan was adopted by the national Cybersecurity Council, and the group includes the Ministry of Innovation and Digital Transformation, the Interior Ministry, the Defence Ministry and the State Agency for National Security (DANS). The ministry says the attackers have now been cut off from their infrastructure and their command-and-control channels blocked. IPN reports that the software the attackers installed has been removed.
Reports also differ on when the access ended. Novinite says the operation ran "until August". Novinite.bg's account of the ministry statement says the presence lasted from 2021 "to the present", until the containment work removed it. Either way, the attackers were in the networks for close to five years before they were found.
The attackers have not been named publicly. Vasilev did not say which countries the groups operated from. IPN reports he said investigators have not established whether the groups worked independently or together, or whether they acted for foreign governments or intelligence services. BTA's Bulgarian report says Bulgarian experts are working with all national security services and with EU and NATO partners to identify them.
What Was Taken
- Volume: at least 130 GB of government documents, which the minister equated to more than 62 million pages. Every report gives this figure, and the minister presented it as a minimum.
- Type: documents and information passed between state institutions through government document-exchange systems. BTA quotes the minister saying the attackers collected "sensitive information related to the work of the Bulgarian state." According to Novinite, they gathered data on how the administration operates.
- Personal data: the government says it has found no evidence so far that citizens' personal data was affected. "So far" matters here. With at least 130 GB taken over five years, a full review of what was in the stolen material will take time.
No classification level has been given for the stolen documents, and the government has not said which ministries or agencies were affected.
Why It Matters
Dwell time is the main lesson. Attackers who stay inside government document-exchange systems for close to five years can read internal government business across several cabinets. Vasilev said directly that the activity "had gone undetected for years, across several governments and administrations, because the existing security measures did not function as a single integrated system." Network and Information Security Directorate head Velizar Varbanov credited the new national system for finding incidents that "had remained undetected for five years."
Several groups were inside at the same time. Several separate groups in the same networks suggests the weaknesses were common knowledge among capable attackers, or at least easy to find. Removing one group does not mean the others are gone.
It is part of a wider pattern of Bulgarian public-sector breaches. Other incidents in recent weeks are unrelated to this espionage case but show how exposed Bulgaria's public sector is:
- In October, Blitz.bg, citing BNR, reported that the State Fund Agriculture platform used by farmers to apply for national and EU funding had been breached. About 88,450 user records, including ID, address, contact and financial data, were reportedly offered for sale on a hacker forum. The agriculture ministry said it applies "the highest standards" of protection and gave no further details.
- On 28 October, Bulgaria's organised crime unit, GDBOP, detained a 19-year-old in Sofia. BurgasMedia reports that police and prosecutors accuse him of breaching companies, state and municipal websites, and the national broadcasters BNT and BNR, then selling the data. Reports disagree on the charges: one outlet says four articles of the Criminal Code, while 24 Chasa reports three counts. The case is at an early stage and he has not been convicted.
Neither case has been linked to the espionage operation. Together they show financially motivated and state-level intruders both active against Bulgarian public systems.
There will be political fallout. Because the minister has referred possible "actions and inactions" by state bodies to prosecutors, this is likely to become a question of official accountability as well as a technical incident.
The Attack Technique
Few technical details have been published. No indicators of compromise, malware names or initial access method have been disclosed. Public statements give the following:
- Target: systems that state institutions use to exchange official documents and information.
- Movement: Novinite and the ministry statement say the attackers moved freely between different parts of the infrastructure. That points to weak network segmentation and possibly shared credentials or trust relationships between agencies.
- Persistence: the attackers kept covert, long-term access and installed software, since IPN reports that "software installed by the hackers" was removed.
- Command and control: the ministry says the containment work blocked the attackers' control channels.
- Detection gap: existing defences ran in isolation, so no one could see activity across the whole government network until the new national system was deployed.
How the groups first got in, and whether they shared entry points, remains unknown. No vendor or CERT technical advisory has been published.
What Organizations Should Do
- Bring telemetry into one place. Collect logs from endpoints, network sensors, identity systems and email gateways in one central platform. Bulgaria's failure was isolated tools that no one looked at together, and it lasted five years.
- Hunt for old intrusions as well as new ones. When new monitoring goes live, deliberately search historical logs and current traffic for long-running beaconing, unusual outbound data volumes and dormant persistence. Assume an attacker may already be inside.
- Segment document-exchange and inter-agency systems. Treat shared document platforms as high-value targets. Limit trust between connected organisations, require strong authentication between services, and alert on unusual cross-segment access.
- Watch for slow, steady data theft. 130 GB over five years averages well under 100 MB a day. Set baselines per host and per account, and alert on sustained outbound transfers to unfamiliar destinations, not only large spikes.
- Plan for more than one intruder. When you find one group, look for others. Rebuild compromised systems from known-good images, reset credentials and keys across connected systems, and check for each group's persistence methods separately.
- Practise cross-agency incident response. Bulgaria's response depended on a working group that brought together several ministries and security agencies. Agree in advance who leads, how evidence is shared, and how international partners such as EU and NATO CERTs are brought in.
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