Attackers who spent most of a week inside the IT systems of the Swiss canton of Basel-Landschaft (Basel-Country) stole about 97,000 records from a database of work permits for cross-border commuters. The canton's State Chancellery confirmed the theft on 20 November 2026, five days after the attacks began. The stolen records include names, home addresses, dates of birth, marital status, job roles and federal migration ID numbers, along with contact details for employers in the canton. They cover every cross-border commuter permit (the "G permit") applied for in Basel-Landschaft since 28 November 2016. That means nearly ten years of data on workers who live mostly in neighbouring Germany and France. Nobody has claimed the attack and the canton has not named a suspect. A criminal complaint has been filed against persons unknown.
What Happened
The canton says several attacks have been hitting its administration's IT systems since Sunday, 15 November 2026. Here is how the incident has played out in public:
- Night of 17 to 18 November: The national alert app Alertswiss warned that the emergency numbers 112, 117 and 118 in Basel-Landschaft might not work properly because of technical problems. The warning was withdrawn a few hours later. Government spokesperson Nic Kaufmann told reporters that the numbers had stayed reachable throughout. He said the warning went out as a precaution because officials did not yet know whether more servers would have to be cut off from the internet.
- 18 November: The State Chancellery confirmed the attacks publicly. It said the cybersecurity team within the cantonal crisis staff was leading the response and had disconnected some servers from the internet, so cantonal online services might go down. According to 2clics, which cites the Basler Zeitung, Kaufmann called the attack "violent and very large-scale". He also said the administration could still work and that police, ambulance and fire services remained reachable.
- 18 November (evening update): The canton said about 20 applications were affected, all running on six servers that are now being reinstalled. One example it gave was an old tax calculator that has since been replaced. Keystone-SDA reports that the IT systems of the canton's emergency and security services were not affected at any point.
- 20 November: The canton announced that forensic analysis by outside cybersecurity experts showed the attackers had accessed the cross-border worker permit database and taken data from it. Two days earlier, The Swiss Press had noted that officials had not yet said whether any files were copied.
The canton has informed the Federal Office for Cybersecurity (BACS), its data protection supervisory authority, the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, and the German and French embassies. Blick, carrying the Swiss news agency ATS report, says work to contain the attack is continuing around the clock. RSI reports that the investigation into the attack and the search for those responsible are ongoing.
What Was Taken
The canton's own statement lists the following fields across about 97,000 records:
- Full name
- Home address
- Date of birth
- Marital status
- Job role
- ZEMIS identification number (ZEMIS is the federal Central Migration Information System)
- Contact details of employers in Basel-Landschaft
All reports give the same figure of 97,000. There are two small differences in wording:
- Records versus people. The canton refers to 97,000 records. Some headlines, including Blick's and RSI's, describe this as data on "97,000 cross-border workers", and Blick says "more than 97,000". Permits are renewed and people change jobs, so one person may appear in more than one record. The number of individuals affected could therefore be lower than 97,000. The canton has not published a count of individuals.
- Date versus place of birth. Blick's French-language report says places of birth were taken. The canton's German-language statement and the other reports say date of birth. The canton's own wording should be taken as correct.
Nobody has reported passport numbers, bank details or Swiss social security numbers among the stolen data. Still, the combination of identity details, migration ID numbers and named employers is exactly what a convincing impersonation needs.
Why It Matters
The victims are mostly outside Switzerland. Most G-permit holders live in Germany or France. That is why the canton told both embassies, and it means people abroad will be targeted by fraud built on Swiss government data. Victims may also find it harder to get help, because their own national authorities did not issue the permits.
The data makes phishing more convincing. An attacker who knows a worker's employer, job role, date of birth and migration ID number can pose as the cantonal migration office, a Swiss tax authority or the worker's own HR department, and sound believable. Possible scams include fake permit renewal fees, fake requests to "verify" an identity, and fake changes to salary bank details. The canton warns of a risk of phishing and possibly identity theft, and advises people to question any unexpected contact.
Employers are targets too. The theft included employer contact details linked to the workers they employ. This gives fraudsters what they need for invoice and payroll-diversion scams aimed at companies in Basel-Landschaft.
Old systems were part of the attack surface. One of the affected applications was a tax calculator the canton had already replaced. Retired or replaced applications that stay online are a common way in for attackers. This should prompt a review at any public body still running old tools on internet-facing servers.
It fits a wider pattern in Switzerland. The Swiss Press notes that the incident follows other recent Swiss incidents. Holiday operator Reka warned 8,200 customers after a booking-system hack, and the federal pension fund Publica dealt with an incident at one of its suppliers. Switzerland introduced a 24-hour reporting obligation for cyberattacks on critical infrastructure in 2025. Cantons such as Bern are now asking local government offices to report incidents within the same 24-hour window.
The Attack Technique
How the attackers got in is not known. The canton has not said how they gained access, which attacker or group is responsible, or whether ransom was demanded. It has not described the attack as ransomware, and nobody has publicly claimed it.
What is confirmed:
- The attacks took place over several days starting 15 November, not as a single break-in. The canton calls them "various attacks" on its infrastructure.
- The impact was concentrated on about 20 applications hosted on six servers. The canton chose to rebuild those servers rather than clean them, which suggests it no longer trusted them.
- At some point the attackers reached a database of cross-border worker permits and copied data out of it.
- The canton took servers offline to contain the attack, which disrupted public digital services.
Until the canton or BACS publishes technical details, any explanation of how access was gained would be speculation. Defenders should watch for indicators of compromise or an advisory from BACS.
What Organizations Should Do
- Find and remove old applications that are still online. List every internet-facing application, including ones you have replaced but never switched off, such as old calculators, forms and portals. Shut down anything without a current owner, or move it off servers that can reach production databases.
- Separate databases holding sensitive personal data from public-facing servers. Permit, migration and tax databases should only be reachable from the specific application servers that need them, with strong login controls and alerts when large amounts of data are queried or exported.
- Watch for unusual outbound data transfers. Over a multi-day intrusion, an export of around 97,000 rows should be detectable. Alert on large or unusual data flows leaving database and application servers, especially at night or over weekends.
- Plan your public alerts in advance. The precautionary warning about emergency numbers in Basel-Landschaft caused confusion. Prepare message templates and decision criteria for disruption to critical services before an incident happens, so warnings are accurate and quickly corrected.
- Employers with cross-border staff should tighten payroll and HR checks. Confirm every request to change bank details or personal data through a second, known channel. Tell staff not to trust messages just because the sender knows their permit or employment details.
- Affected individuals should treat any contact about their permit as suspicious. The canton has set up an FAQ page at www.bl.ch/FAQData with guidance on what to do. Do not pay fees or share documents in response to unexpected emails, texts or calls. Contact the authority directly using contact details you have checked yourself.
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